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ABSTRACT
35 U.S.C. § 101 allows a patent for “any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof.” Recently, the Supreme Court issued several key
decisions affecting the doctrine of patentable subject matter under
§ 101. Starting with Bilski v. Kappos (2011), and continuing with
Mayo Collaborative Services, Inc. v. Prometheus Laboratories (2012),
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) and,
most recently, Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International
(2014), every year has brought another major change to the way in
which the Court assesses patentability. In Myriad, the Court directly
addressed the patentability of isolated genetic material. Due to the un-
derlying biological phenomena involved, this decision split genetic ma-
terial into two groups. Large, complex animal, plant, and fungal genes
remain patentable under some limited circumstances, while viral, bac-
terial, and simple eukaryotic genes are categorically unpatentable. The
biotechnology industry evolved in an era in which gene patents were
freely granted. As a result, legal and regulatory pathways have
emerged that allow existing biotechnology products to be protected in
many of the same ways as traditional pharmaceutical products. How-
ever, entirely new areas of biotechnology, those emerging in the
shadow of Myriad, may be threatened by a deprivation of the incentives
and protection that the patent system offers. This Note discusses one
such new area of biotechnology, non-coding RNA therapeutics and di-
agnostics, and the ways in which the categorical exclusion of some
* J.D., University of Michigan, 2015 (expected); Ph.D., Biology, University of
Oregon, 2004; B.A., Molecular, Cellular and Developmental Biology, Biochemistry,
University of Colorado, Boulder, 1997. Thanks to Professor Rebecca S. Eisenberg for
productive discussions and to Keith Lim and Micah Siegel Wallace for editorial assistance.
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genes threatens this promising area of innovation. In addressing this, I
propose a re-ordering of the patentable subject matter analysis that
would ameliorate many of these issues.
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INTRODUCTION
In June of 2013, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Associ-
ation of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.1 The Court held that iso-
lated, but otherwise “unmodified” genetic material is not patentable under 35
U.S.C. § 101, and therefore effectively barred the patenting of (most) human
genes. This was seen as a victory by those who had long felt ethical discom-
fort with fundamental elements of our biology being “owned,” and those
who believed that gene patents inhibited access genetic diagnostics, a key
aspect of modern healthcare.2 However, The Biotechnology Industry Organi-
zation decried the loss of gene patents as an unjustified attack on the re-
search enterprise which harmed the pursuit of novel drugs or diagnostic
methods.3
1. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
2. Glen Hess, High Court Nixes Gene Patents, CHEM. AND ENGINEERING NEWS, June
17, 2013, at 7; Borsellino, M., World Medical Association Tackling Health Database Issue. 36
MED. POST. 40 (2000).
3. Press Release, Biotechnology Indus. Org., Statement On U.S. Supreme Court Re-
view Of Isolated DNA Patents, Jun. 13, 2013), available at http://www.bio.org/media/press-re
lease/statement-us-supreme-court-review-isolated-dna-patents; see also Brief for Biotechnol-
ogy Industry Organization & the Association of University Technology Managers as Amici
Curiae Supporting Reversal at 12–14, Ass’n for Mol. Pathol. v USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853322 at *27–33, for a more detailed account of
BIO’s long-standing argument.
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Patent practitioners, however, had been awaiting a clarifying statement
from the Court on the nature of patentable subject matter, one of the most
difficult aspects of patentability to pin down.4 The decision of the Court did
little to clarify this area of law, and may have created more confusion than it
alleviated. This confusion has to do with two underlying mismatches be-
tween the decision as it was written and the technology that it ultimately
affects. First, the decision fails to meaningfully define what a “gene” is or to
delimit what a “DNA Sequence” entails. Second, and more troubling, the
decision creates a “categorical inclusion,” defining cDNA5 as per se patenta-
ble, so long as its sequence is different from that of the corresponding geno-
mic sequence.6 As the opinion notes in passing, this necessarily creates a
categorical exclusion for cDNAs that have sequences identical to their corre-
sponding genomic sequences.7 Perhaps unbeknownst to the justices, this cat-
egory includes a vast number of biologically relevant genes, including all
viral genes, bacterial genes, and significant segments of mammalian (includ-
ing human) genomes.8
This categorical divide has disparate impacts on innovation in biotech-
nology research sectors depending on the maturity of the sector. In the more
mature areas of protein biologics (including antibodies), there are enough
well-understood areas of patentable novelty outside the basic genetic se-
quences that underlie these products such that biologics can be well-pro-
tected in the absence of a gene patent.9 Genetic diagnostics, as a less mature
part of the industry, are at a greater risk. But, as will be described below, the
combination of market forces and FDA exclusivities along with the rela-
tively low cost of diagnostics development is likely to ensure that adequate
incentives to innovate remain post-Myriad.10 As will be discussed below, a
4. See, e.g., Eileen M. Kane, Patenting Genes and Genetic Methods: What’s at Stake?,
6 J. BUS. TECH. L. 1, 5 (2011) (“Volatility in the judicially-created tests for patentable subject
matter has been a feature of this area of patent law. The unstable nature of the patent eligibility
doctrine is evident from patent law jurisprudence, as legal tests have been developed at one
juncture, only to fall out of use or into explicit disregard or repudiation.”).
5. cDNA, or complementary DNA, consists of genomic sequences that have been tran-
scribed into their corresponding RNA molecules and then reverse-transcribed, using viral en-
zymes, back into DNA. The RNA sequence may be subject to chemical “editing” processes
within the cell that cause its sequence to be different than that of the corresponding genomic
sequence. See BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES V, 149–51, 640–42 (1994).
6. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
7. Id.
8. cDNAs, supra note 5, have different sequences from genomic DNA in the case of
genes from animals, plants, fungi, and protists that are intended to be translated into proteins,
since the intervening non-coding sequences or “introns” are removed through an intracellular
process known as splicing. Regions of the genome that do not encode proteins, as well as all
genes from bacteria and viruses, do not contain introns, and therefore cDNAs derived from
these would be identical to the genomic sequence.
9. See discussion infra, Part I.A.
10. See Mystery Solved! What is the Cost to Develop and Launch a Diagnostic?,
DIACEUTICS, INC., http://www.diaceutics.com/mystery-solved-what-cost-develop-and-launch-
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greater threat to diagnostic development comes from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mayo v. Prometheus. Prometheus, in holding that the relation-
ship between information (in the form of serum metabolite levels) and a
disease state is an unpatentable “law of nature,” casts doubt on the patenta-
bility of diagnostic methods per se.11 Though this Note focuses on the im-
pacts of Myriad on a distinct class of emerging genetic technologies, I will
also argue that reining in the uncertainty in patentable subject matter doc-
trine that led to Myriad will also keep the diagnostics industry safe from the
excesses of Prometheus.
While changes in patentable subject matter doctrine may largely spare
traditional therapeutics and diagnostics, newly emerging genomic technolo-
gies remain deeply vulnerable. Advances in drug delivery technology have
made RNA-based therapeutics plausible, and research into the vast non-cod-
ing regions of the genome—not included in the early versions of the human
genome, which focused on coding sequences only12—has revealed large
numbers of expressed sequences that do not lead to the production of pro-
teins, but have profound effects on physiology.13 Because these sequences
are generally not subject to splicing or editing, their cDNAs will be identical
to the genomic sequence, and thus, fall into Myriad’s categorical exclusion.
Consequently, these potentially groundbreaking sources of novel therapies
and diagnostic methods are not patentable at the level of their most funda-
mental attributes.
This brief review of the unintended consequences of Myriad is not a call
to panic. The past is littered with decisions that caused patent practitioners,
the PTO, and the courts to change the ways they spar over attempts to gain
or deny protection for inventions. Rather, this review is intended to illustrate
the impacts of Myriad and Prometheus on an especially promising area of
biomedical innovation and how the patent system can cope with these ad-
justments to patentable subject matter doctrine.
In Part I, I will briefly discuss the development of the biotechnology
industry and the role of patent incentives in its successes. Using the general
cases of more traditional biotherapeutics and molecular diagnostics, I will
examine several of the ways in which patent and non-patent incentives work
to foster the development of various types of biotechnology products. In Part
II, I will discuss the ways in which Myriad alters these incentives in the case
diagnostic (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (giving a dollar range of $20–106M for the full develop-
ment path of novel diagnostic tests). Compare Christopher P. Adams and Van V. Brantner,
Estimating The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF.
420, 420 (2006) (giving a range of $500M–2B for the total cost of developing a therapeutic
drug).
11. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012)
12. See The Encode Project Consortium, An Integrated Encyclopedia of DNA Elements
in the Human Genome, 489 NATURE 57 (2012).
13. Claes Wahlestedt, Targeting Long Non-Coding RNA to Therapeutically Upregulate
Gene Expression, 12 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 433,434 (2013).
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of products derived from non-coding RNAs. Finally, in Part III, I will com-
pare a number of proposed alternative approaches to the patentable subject
matter conundrum with respect to their ability to meet the needs of both the
patent system and the biotechnology industry. The conclusion of this Note
suggests a relatively minor tweak to existing patentable subject matter analy-
sis that may, at long last, bring stability to the doctrine while at the same
time offer a legal test that does not require judges to be technical subject-
matter experts.
I. GENE PATENTS AS INCENTIVES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
The law surrounding gene patents has long centered on the so-called
“central dogma” of molecular biology: the idea that genes consist of regions
of DNA, which are transcribed into messenger RNA molecules, which are
then translated according to their sequences into their corresponding
polypeptides, which then fold into the proteins that carry out the functions of
the cell. This idea correctly leads to the innovation that to create a biother-
apeutic, one could transfer DNA segments between organisms to engineer
systems to produce particular enzymes, which could then be delivered to
patients who lacked those enzymes.14 The early days of the biotechnology
industry were in fact ushered in by the discovery of ways in which research-
ers could transfer DNA sequences from one organism into another.15 This
process of recombining DNA sequences affected the transfer of mammalian
protein-coding genes into (primarily) bacterial hosts, and it shortly became
possible to generate mammalian proteins on industrial scales using bacterial
bioreactors.16 In the ensuing decades, the basic technology was refined in
minor ways, but the essential steps of (1) removing a gene from a mamma-
lian cell; (2) splicing it into a construct from which the protein could be
produced in another organism;17 (3) directing the production of the protein in
14. This is the case with recombinant glucocerebrosidase, sold as Cerezyme® for the
treatment of Gaucher’s disease. See Cerezyme Prescribing Information, Genzyme Corp., avail-
able at http://www.cerezyme.com/~/media/CerezymeUS/Files/pdf/cerezyme_pi.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 8, 2014).
15. See, e.g., Arnold L. Demain, History of Industrial Biotechnology, in INDUSTRIAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY: SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS 17, 55 (Wim Soetaert and
Erick J. Vandamme, eds., 2010).
16. See, e.g., Scripps Clinic and Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc. 927 F.2d 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (describing litigation over the emergence of recombinant production methods
for a biologic drug that had previously been produced by extracting it from mammalian tissue).
This case resulted in a settlement on remand, after the Federal Circuit found that recombinant
production was so profoundly different from extraction that a drug produced by one process
may not, in fact, infringe the same drug produced by the other process.
17. The coding region of a gene is, according to the “central dogma” of molecular biol-
ogy, first transcribed into a messenger RNA and then translated by the cellular machinery into
the final protein. This occurs so long as special signaling elements, which vary by species, are
present in the DNA. Thus, a mammalian gene can be expressed in a bacterium so long as it is
placed into a larger DNA molecule known as a plasmid that contains the necessary signals
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the new “heterologous” biological system; and then (4) harvesting the ma-
ture protein, have remained the same.18 This process, known as recombinant
protein expression, led to an explosion in the number of therapeutically rele-
vant proteins that could be produced. Suddenly, diseases that could be
treated most effectively by the administration of a protein (such as enzyme
deficiencies) became amenable to treatment with this new class of “bio-
logic” drugs.
Concurrent with these technological developments were developments
in patent law that enabled the protection and monetization of these discover-
ies. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, (source of the famous dictum that patenta-
ble subject matter encompassed “anything under the sun that is made by
man”),19 the Court decided that engineered microorganisms were legitimate
subjects for patenting. After this decision, patents on biological materials,
including DNA molecules and the gene sequences they embodied, were rela-
tively freely granted.20 By claiming isolated DNA molecules with a given
sequence, researchers were able to effectively patent the genetic information
underlying their biological discoveries.21 Gene patents provided early bi-
otech companies with two major advantages: first, they represented an intel-
lectual property asset that could be used to attract investment; and second,
they provided a protected sphere in which further research could be under-
taken to develop the genetic information into a deployable product.22
A distinct subset of the industry emerged to treat those diseases that
were amenable to protein biologics. As the subset of the industry matured,
patent practitioners developed strategies to protect not just the underlying
genetic data, but also the eventual products and manufacturing processes.23
At the same time, it became plausible to use the underlying genetic data to
develop high resolution diagnostic tests, even where development of a pro-
tein therapeutic was not necessarily feasible.24 Thus, the same ability to pat-
directing the bacterial cell to express the protein. Plasmids are an example of an ex-
trachromosomal element that can be used for these purposes. Others include Bacterial Artifi-
cial Chromosomes, and Yeast Artificial Chromosomes. Expression systems can also be
developed in essentially the same way by integrating a gene into the bacterial genome itself, or
into a virus that directs gene expression as part of its infection process.
18. See generally, Michael R. Green & Joseph Sambrook, MOLECULAR CLONING: A
LABORATORY MANUAL (4th ed. 2012).
19. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
20. Roger D. Klein, Gene patents and genetic testing in the United States, 25 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 989, 989–90 (2007).
21. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,623,836 (filed Nov. 23, 2010) (issued Jan. 7, 2014).
22. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. LAW
ECON. 265, 271–275 (1977).
23. See Klein, supra note 20.
24. Goldgar, David E. et al., A Large Kindred With 17q-Linked Breast and Ovarian
Cancer: Genetic, Phenotypic, and Genealogical Analysis, 86 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 200
(1994).
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ent genetic sequences that supported the early-stage development of protein
therapeutics also supported the development of diagnostic tests.
As the science progressed however, it became clear that not all diseases
could be approached by targeting proteins for pharmaceutical intervention.
The early days of molecular biology had focused on the use of DNA to study
and manipulate coding regions—those genes that are responsible for produc-
ing proteins. Now, however, biologists understand that non-coding DNA, the
elements of the genome that do not encode proteins, far from being the “junk
DNA” they were derided as in the past, can have tremendous impacts on
human health.25 These sequences are often expressed as RNA molecules
(following the first step of the “central dogma”26) which perform regulatory
functions within the cell, or other as yet unknown functions.27 These se-
quences are only now being explored for their potential as therapeutics and
diagnostics. Paralleling the biotechnology industry of the late 1970’s and
early 1980’s, these discoveries describe a wide-open frontier in which it is
clear that some fraction of these sequences will be medically relevant,
though their precise identities are not yet known. However, post-Myriad,
these particular sequences are unlikely to be patentable. In the next section I
will discuss the problems raised by this per se exclusion, as well as the
reordering of incentives in the biotechnology industry that Myriad
precipitates.
A. Patent Incentives in Traditional Biotherapeutics
Biotherapeutics traditionally comprise protein-based therapeutic com-
pounds that have formed the canonical output of successful biotech compa-
nies. These include antibody therapeutics; peptides, such as insulin and
Beta-Natriuretic Peptide; enzymes; and other bioactive proteins such as er-
ythropoietin and Bone Morphogenetic Protein.28 The success of these ven-
tures is widely credited to the presence of robust IP protection in the
sequences of the genes encoding the proteins of interest.29 However, it has
long been noted that the value of a gene patent for a therapeutic product lies
primarily in providing the ability to exclude competitors from using the se-
quence to produce proteins of interest rather than in maintaining a monopoly
25. Wahlestedt, supra note 13.
26. See supra note 17.
27. Wahlestedt, supra note 13.
28. See Benjamin Leader et al., Protein Therapeutics: a Summary and Pharmacological
Classification, 7 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 21, 22–32 (January 2008); see, e.g., Cer-
ezyme, supra note 14.
29. This is such a broadly accepted principle that it is often proffered without question.
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value
of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L. J. 783 (2000); Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698
(1998). More robust analysis of this proposition is generally lacking.
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over the information contained within the sequence.30 However, the patent-
ing of genetic sequences for therapeutic development is also valuable in that
it allows researchers to preclude efforts by competitors in the early stages of
drug development, prior to the development of the final product.31
In the early days of the industry, it was not always clear what the result
of research into newly discovered genes would be.32 Therefore, patents on
genes underlying biological discoveries served, in the case of each individ-
ual project, to keep the innovation horizon open until the contours of the
final product could be determined.33 This suggests that, for more mature seg-
ments of the industry, patent protection for underlying discoveries is less of
a pressing concern, as a more developed understanding of the types of prod-
ucts that will ultimately result from a technology will provide a tighter focus
for drafting patent claims.
Mature products, developed over decades of research, are protectable
through webs of overlapping patent rights, including methods of use, meth-
ods of manufacture, and possibly formulation, or by FDA-granted regulatory
exclusivities.34 These product-level protections have been developed and
honed over the development of the biotechnology industry as patent practi-
30. See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 788 (“The commercially significant aspect of these
discoveries was not the informational value of knowing what the sequence was, but the tangi-
ble value of being able to use the DNA molecules in recombinant production facilities to make
therapeutic proteins for sale.”).
31. See id. at 788–89. Professor Eisenberg argues that patent protection is especially
useful in cases in which it is clear that the final product will be valuable, but it is not clear
what exactly it will be.
32. Though it may seem self-evident that, for example, the ultimate product derived
from cloning the insulin gene would be the insulin molecule itself, the nature of biomolecules
is such that substantial modifications must often be made after the gene is expressed in order to
transform the gene product into a biologically useful form. Moreover, further modifications
may be necessary to render a biomolecule “drug-like” enough that it can be administered to
patients. Thus, the final drug product may well be a fragment of the expressed molecule, an
adduct (the molecule attached to another, better behaved molecule), a chemically modified
version of the molecule, or, in fact even something totally separate, such as an activating or
inhibitory antibody, or an unknown, yet-to-be-invented pharmaceutical moiety. The drug de-
velopment process is full of surprises.
33. This is an embodiment of the prospect theory of patents, in which early patenting
protects the ability of inventors of rudimentary technologies to develop commercial applica-
tions. See Kitch, supra note 22, at 270–71.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E) (2012); See also JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42890, THE ROLE OF PATENTS AND REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITIES IN PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION (2013) for an overview of exclusivities available to new pharmaceutical products.
Briefly, new drugs are generally granted a period of 5 years, with some exceptions, from the
date of approval of their New Drug Applications before the data that supported the application
can be exploited by other manufacturers in filing Abbreviated New Drug Applications to bring
generic drugs to market. See id. at 4–5. Due to the expense of developing these data, the effect
of this is to bar the introduction of generic forms of a drug until 5 years after the original
version is approved. Id. at 4. See also Gregory Dolan, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New
Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1459–62 (2013) for
a comparison of the patent and FDA-granted exclusivities and suggestions on improvements.
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tioners grappled with the legal aspects of protecting new technology along-
side the scientists and engineers working to develop the technology.
B. Patent Incentives in Traditional Genetic Diagnostics
The essence of a genetic diagnostic is the correlation between a gene
sequence and a physiological condition. Historically, the observation of
these correlations has preceded the identification of potential therapeutics for
the same conditions. The genetic diagnostics family tree reaches back, if not
quite so far as Mendel and his peas, at least to the practice of karyotyping,
which in the early to mid-20th century allowed correlations to be drawn
between large-scale rearrangements of chromosomes and gross congenital
pathologies.35 The emergence of the field of molecular biology that spawned
the biotechnology revolution was inseparable from the practice of identify-
ing genetic markers that were correlated with phenotypes, which were often
disease states.36 The invention of DNA sequencing in the late 1970’s37 repre-
sented a wholesale shift in the way this analysis could be carried out, al-
lowing disease states to be mapped onto the coding regions of specific
proteins. In many cases, DNA sequencing operated hand-in-glove with the
emergence of biotherapeutics development, addressed above.
Perhaps because these technological developments occurred against the
backdrop of the emergence of gene patentability, and in part because of the
sophisticated expertise and equipment required, the concept of a genetic di-
agnostic as a salable product emerged as well. In essence, these tests func-
tion by obtaining genetic data about a patient, and comparing it to reference
sequences obtained from both healthy and diseased populations. As in the
case of the BRCA1/2 genetic tests, the discovery and patenting of a genetic
sequence that is correlated with a human disease leads quite readily to the
development of a diagnostic “product” that can be ordered by physicians,
paid for by insurers, and otherwise integrated into our current practice of
medicine.38 Development of a diagnostic can be, in principle, much faster
and conceptually simpler than development of a biotherapeutic.39 However,
35. Tom Strachan & Andrew Read, HUMAN MOLECULAR GENETICS 48, fig. 2.18 (4th
ed., 2011).
36. See generally Lewin, supra note 5, at 59-69.
37. Frederick Sanger et al., DNA Sequencing With Chain-Terminating Inhibitors, 74
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5463 (1977).
38. See Milunsky, Aubrey, The New Genetics: From Research to Reality. 27 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1307, 1312 (1993) (asserting that as early as 1993, identification of potential diag-
nostics was a routine part of genetic research); see also H. Z. Noorani, et al. Cost Comparison
Of Molecular Versus Conventional Screening Of Relatives At Risk For Retinoblastoma, 59
AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 302, 302 (Aug 1996) (Describing the process for financial valuation
of a genetic diagnostic test).
39. Identification of the gene/disease correlations that mark the proof of concept stage
for a genetic research project represents substantial completion of a diagnostic development
effort, but is only the beginning of a drug development effort. Here, I consider “proof of
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because the core of a diagnostic technology is the underlying sequence infor-
mation itself, these products are also at greater risk from alterations in pat-
entable subject matter doctrines.
Exploitation of genomic data in the development of genetic diagnostic
tests is the area in which the Myriad decision would be expected to have its
most obvious impacts. However, the focus of diagnostics development (as
was the case in biotherapeutics development) on protein coding regions
helps to insulate it from the worst effects of Myriad. The Myriad decision
only removed patent protection for genomic DNA sequences, not for cDNAs
which encompass specific protein coding regions.40 Because cDNA se-
quences can be protected, diagnostics that rely on comparisons of sequences
of protein coding genes can continue to assert their patent rights on this
basis.41
Additionally, patentability of genetic diagnostics is also called into
questioned by a series of other § 101 decisions in addition to Myriad, includ-
ing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Bilski v. Kap-
pos, and most recently, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. V. CLS Bank, International.42
In Prometheus, the Court held that a diagnostic method based on a compari-
son of drug metabolite levels to known reference values was unpatentable as
having been drawn to a “Law of Nature.”43 In Bilski v. Kappos, the Court
held that a method for hedging risk in energy markets was drawn to an un-
patentable set of “mental steps,”44 a holding that has since been extended by
at least one lower court to invalidate medical diagnostic methods as well.45
The CLS Bank decision ostensibly dealt with software-related claims, but
purported to offer additional structure for the analysis of “laws of nature” or
“abstract ideas.”46 One lower court has since used the CLS Bank framework
to affirm Prometheus’ analysis of diagnostic methods in the genetic context,
concept” the point at which alterations in a specific gene are found to be correlated with a
specific disease state. The development path for a diagnostic, then, consists mainly of refining
these correlations in order to provide reliable diagnoses, while the drug development path
consists of attempts to manipulate this correlation by altering the activity (broadly construed)
of the gene or its product. Notably, both paths can diverge from initial studies of the same
gene.
40. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117–19
(2013).
41. Myriad Genetics, the defendant in the Myriad suit, has relied on just this aspect of
the decision to continue to assert its patent portfolio against accused infringers. See First
Amended Complaint Demand for Jury Trial at ¶ 33, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Ambry
Genetics Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00640-RJS (D. Utah, July 19, 2013).
42. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski
v. Kappos, 563 U.S. 593 (2010); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
43. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1305.
44. Bilski, 563 U.S. at 600.
45. Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Laboratories, SA, and ABL Patent Licens-
ing Techs., Sarl, 555 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24, 2014).
46. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2355–58.
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rendering one gene-based diagnostic per se unpatentable.47 The combination
of these decisions could comprise a formidable barrier to the extension of
patent protection to genetic diagnostics, though so far the decisions have
been limited in their application to simple one-step diagnostics, and thus
their effect on more complex diagnostic methods remains to be seen.
On the other hand, genomic diagnostics benefit from a wide set of alter-
native incentives that support their development, which may help to offset
the uncertainty currently lingering over the patent monopolies at the core of
each individual test. For example, the underlying data, in which large popu-
lations are “mined” for correlations between disease states and specific ge-
netic mutations, are often generated by large-scale, university-based,
publicly funded research efforts. The patents at issue in Myriad, for exam-
ple, were based on research carried out at the University of Utah, the To-
ronto Hospital for Sick Children, and the National Institutes of Health,
among others, primarily using public funding.48 While this is largely in
keeping with the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act,49 it suggests that much of
the work that leads to the development of a genetic diagnostic test can be
accomplished prior to the need for private investment. This in turn suggests
that perhaps even weakened patent incentives would be sufficient to support
development of additional tests.
A comparison to drug development is instructive here. The most oner-
ous and expensive elements of drug development are by and large carried
out using private funding.50 These early stages of drug development require
47. Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Lab. Corp. of America, No. 12–1736–LPS–CJB, 2014 WL
4379587 at *10–13 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss under F.R.C.P 12(b)(6)
on the grounds that application of Prometheus under the framework given in CLS Bank re-
quired a finding that a patent claim drawn to a genetic diagnostic was unpatentable as claiming
a Law of Nature).
48. See Goldgar, supra note 24, at 200–209, for descriptions of the genetic efforts that
correlated the BRCA1 gene with breast cancer and acknowledgement of the funding sources
that paid for these efforts; see also L. H. Castilla et al., Mutations in the BRCA1 gene in
families with early-onset breast and ovarian cancer 8 NATURE GENETICS 387, 391 (1994), for
details of the cloning of the BRCA1 gene and discovery of its sequence, as well as acknowl-
edgement of the funding sources that made this possible. At issue in Myriad were U.S. Patents
No. 5,693,473 (filed Jun. 7, 1995), No. 5,747,282 (filed Jun. 7, 1995) and No. 5,837,492 (filed
Apr. 29, 1996). These list among their initial assignees the University of Utah Foundation, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the Trustees of the University of Penn-
sylvania, among others. No privately funded organization is listed as a primary assignee of any
of these patents.
49. The Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200–212 (2012), was enacted in 1980 with the
goal of incentivizing the commercialization of publicly-funded research results by allowing
publicly funded entities to patent their discoveries. A detailed discussion of this legislation is
beyond the scope of this Note.
50. See DIACEUTICS, supra note 10 (giving a range of $20–106M for the full develop-
ment path of novel diagnostic tests); cf. Christopher P. Adams and Van V. Brantner, Estimat-
ing The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 420,
420 (2006) (giving a range of $500M–2B for total cost of developing a therapeutic drug).
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very strong incentives, especially with regard to sales exclusivity for suc-
cessful drugs, to induce investors to shoulder the significant risks and mas-
sive financial outlays required to push a drug through the development and
approval process. The most significant development cost is the risk of fail-
ure—that significant investments will not be recouped due to the drug being
unsafe or ineffective. By contrast, the risks in the development of molecular
diagnostics arise almost entirely in the proof of concept stage. Because the
protocols for extracting DNA samples are now routine, and analysis of the
samples is carried out outside the body, safety concerns are ameliorated and
the risk of failure of the diagnostics is reduced to the risk of ineffectiveness
only. The development of molecular diagnostics can also involve less in-
house development, since the work that must be done to validate a diagnos-
tic method (calculating the correlations between disease states and gene vari-
ants) can, and in fact must, be done at the proof of concept stage.51 This
leaves developers with high confidence that a diagnostic method will work,
further reducing the risk of failure. This reduction in the risk of failure corre-
spondingly reduces the need for a patent monopoly as an incentive for
investment.52
In addition, state and federal regulatory policies provide other incentives
for diagnostic development. For example, when drugs are developed for use
in personalized medicine or as “targeted therapeutics,” the FDA informally
requires the simultaneous development of “companion diagnostics:” diag-
nostic tests that serve to identify the probability that a patient will benefit
from the drug.53 Producers of the underlying drug products, in addition to
their patent monopolies, also benefit from exclusivities granted by the FDA.
These exclusives, among other incentives, generally grant new drugs a 5-
year period of exclusive sales before generic competitors are allowed to
enter the market.54 The ability to co-brand a diagnostic with a drug that en-
joys sales exclusivity helps create a powerful market position due to the
familiarity of the brand name and the status of the diagnostic as the “offi-
51. See Sanger, supra note 37.
52. See WILLIAM M. LANDES AND RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 300 (1st ed. 2003) (“The greater the fixed costs of research and
development and the easier it is to invent around the patent, the greater will be the degree of
patent protection required to create adequate incentives to invest in developing the invention in
the first place.”); see also Lori B. Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual
Property Rights, 3 NATURE REVS.: GENETICS 803, 805 (2002).
53. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. DRAFT GUI-
DANCE, IN VITRO COMPANION DIAGNOSTIC DEVICES, section IV (A and C) (2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDoc
uments/UCM262327.pdf.
54. See Kitch, supra note 22. It has been argued that a version of this system of exclu-
sivities could be developed to protect genomic diagnostics, see Gregory Dolan, Exclusivity
Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 1399, 1456 (2013), but this discussion is beyond the scope of this Note.
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cial” test.55 Certainly not all genetic diagnostic tests will be able to benefit,
but this serves as an example of the alternative modes of obtaining market
power that are available to diagnostics developers.
Makers of diagnostic tests can also pursue market share, though not out-
right exclusivity, at the state level. The first molecular diagnostics case to be
decided on the basis of Myriad pitted two purveyors of prenatal genetic di-
agnostic tests against one another. The question before the court was
whether circulating fetal DNA (cfDNA) constituted patentable subject mat-
ter.56 Though the Northern District of California held cfDNA to be unpatent-
able, Ariosa Diagnostics has moved forward aggressively with a strategy of
attempting to register their service as a preferred diagnostic test with various
state health authorities.57 Though this falls short of the monopoly provided
by a patent on the underlying genetic sequences, this type of lesser regula-
tory advantage provides a mechanism through which a company can deploy
a diagnostic test in a way that allows it to recoup is development costs.
Genomic diagnostics thus benefit from a combination of factors that
support their development in the presence of greatly diminished patent in-
centives. They are able to utilize publicly-funded research for a greater pro-
portion of their development costs, and they have reduced downstream risk.
The ability of developers to avoid the worst consequences of the Myriad
decision by focusing on protein coding genes suggests that this segment will
survive, if not thrive, in a post-Myriad world. However, not all medically
important genomic alterations reside within protein coding regions. Non-
coding regions are, as it turns out, home to a rich array of sequences that
affect human health in ways that are only beginning to be understood. These
comprise a radically new area of biotechnology that is under dire threat in
the Myriad-induced absence of patent protection, and thus will form the ba-
sis of Part II.
C. Impacts on the Exploitation of Next-Generation Genomic Data
As mentioned above, relatively mature areas of biotechnology develop-
ment benefit from the fact that the basic parameters of the technology are
known. The outputs from conventional biotechnology will generally be bi-
otherapeutics or bio-produced compounds. For patent practitioners, this
55. See Landes and Posner, supra note 51, at 314 for a discussion of “trademark-rein-
forcing patents” in the pharmaceutical industry for an analogous case.
56. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., No. C 11-06391 SI, 2013 WL 5863022
at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013).
57. See Illumina, Natera, Ariosa tests win contracts with CA’s prenatal Dx program,
FIERCEDIAGNOSTICS (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.fiercediagnostics.com/story/illumina-natera-ar
iosa-tests-gain-contracts-cas-prenatal-dx-program/2013-11-01; Ariosa’s prenatal test gains
crucial New York lab licensing certification, FIERCEDIAGNOSTICS (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www
.fiercediagnostics.com/story/ariosas-prenatal-test-gains-crucial-new-york-lab-licensing-certifi
cation/2014-02-14.’’
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means that these molecules can be protected by targeted patent strategies
emphasizing their roles as treatment methods, as compositions of matter, or
as processes of production. Though it may not be ideal from the standpoint
of limiting investment risk, patent protection for the gene sequence underly-
ing the development of the technology can fall to a matter of secondary
importance.
Likewise, in the realm of genetic diagnostics, the ultimate output is fore-
seeable: a test in which specific genetic sequences are correlated with dis-
ease states and disease risks. It is slightly more difficult to separate patent
protection for a gene sequence from patent protection for a genetic diagnos-
tic. However, the reduced development path for these products relative to
therapeutics, as well as the availability of secondary incentives, means that
in theory, diagnostic tests can be developed in the absence of the kind of
direct patent incentives provided by a gene patent.58 Both drugs and diagnos-
tics benefit from decades of effort by inventors and patent practitioners to
identify effective strategies to protect innovation in these sectors. Therefore
the loss of patent protection for gene sequences is unlikely to destroy either
enterprise.
It is less clear how rendering genomic DNA unpatentable per se will
affect emerging sectors of the biotechnology industry. Most notably, the use
of “non-coding” gene sequences, often referred to as “genomic dark matter,”
will be directly affected.59 Because the number of diseases that are amenable
to traditional biotherapeutics is relatively small, non-coding RNA (ncRNA)
has gained importance as an emerging area of drug and diagnostic develop-
ment. Those diseases whose etiology is rooted in the lack of a necessary
enzyme, or a mutated or dysfunctional variant of a single protein represent
the low hanging fruit of biotechnology. However, many diseases instead in-
volve misregulation of a gene, where the gene product itself is perfectly
functional, but the cellular machinery make too much or too little of it.60
Conventional therapeutics offer very little in the way of treatments for this
type of disorder. By contrast, the world of ncRNAs discussed below contains
a large number of disease-relevant modulators of gene expression, and gives
hope that treatments for several as yet intractable human diseases may be
within reach.61
Simultaneously, developments in drug delivery, and especially in na-
notechnology, have made it possible to deliver RNA molecules in clinically
58. See generally Note, Diagnostic Method Patents and Harms to Follow-On Innova-
tion, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1370 (2013) (presenting a more thorough evaluation of the arguments
for and against the idea that barring gene patents will be detrimental to the development of
future diagnostic technologies).
59. Lance Martin & Howard Y. Chang, Uncovering the Role of Genomic “Dark Mat-
ter” in Human Disease, 122 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1589 (2012).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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relevant ways.62 This means that, for the first time, the idea of manipulating
gene regulation in disease using RNA molecules can be realistically pursued.
Furthermore, the same RNA-encoding “gene” that is used to diagnose a
health issue may also be deployed directly to treat it. Thus, it is possible that
this area of biotechnology may be extraordinarily sensitive to the loss of
patent protection for specific genomic sequences.
II. AWAY FROM THE CENTRAL DOGMA:
NONCODING RNA’S IN HUMAN HEALTH
The completion of the human genome project in 2000 was rightly her-
alded as a major milestone in the evolution of the biomedical sciences. In the
ensuing years, the breakthroughs that were promised in the hyperbolic
buildup to the project largely failed to materialize.63 Though the availability
of such an enormous mass of genomic information did revolutionize the way
genetic science was done, it did not lead immediately to cures for diseases
(and in many cases, even credible diagnostic modalities for disease).64 Nota-
bly, the human genome (as well as most eukaryotic genomes) contains large
amounts of untranslated DNA—that is, DNA whose sequence does not en-
code any protein. This DNA, formerly referred to as “junk DNA” is located
between protein coding genes, and sometimes even interjected within the
sequence that encodes a protein.65 It has been appreciated for some time that
many diseases with their origins in human genes result from misregulation
of protein coding genes, rather than mutation.66 As the search for these regu-
lators moved forward,67 it emerged that a number of these clinically relevant
62. RNA molecules are not chemically stable enough to be delivered to the body using
conventional formulations, but when they are specially protected, they can be readily delivered
to their sites of action. See, e.g., Rosemary Kanasty et al., Delivery Materials for siRNA Thera-
peutics, 12 NATURE MATERIALS 967 (2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,673,875 (filed Dec. 11, 2012).
63. See Nicholas Wade, A Decade Later, Genetic Map Yields Few New Cures, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2010, at A1; but see Declan Butler, Science After the Sequence, 466 NATURE
1000, 1000–01 (2010).
64. Id.
65. The sequences “interjected within” protein coding genes are the infamous “introns”
that Justice Thomas referred to in the Myriad decision. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct 2107, 2111 (2013). The coding sequences are generally re-
ferred to as “exons.” Protein coding genes that contain multiple exons separated by introns are
referred to as “polycistronic” and those protein coding genes that lack introns are referred to as
“monocistronic.
66. See Wahlestedt, supra note 13.
67. As in the case of the genome effort, much of the productive work in this area
emerged from academic consortia such as the Encyclopedia of DNA Elements (ENCODE)
consortium and the RNA-focused follow-on effort, GENCODE. See The Encode Project Con-
sortium, An Integrated Encyclopedia of DNA Elements in the Human Genome, 489 NATURE 57
(2012); Thomas Derrien, et al., The GENCODE v7 Catalog of Human Long Noncoding RNAs:
Analysis of their Gene Structure, Evolution, and Expression, 22 GENOME RESEARCH 1775
(2012).
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regulatory molecules were in fact RNAs that were encoded by the “junk”
DNA that had so long been ignored.68
Non-coding RNAs (ncRNAs) exist in a number of types, including long
non-coding RNAs, short inhibitory RNAs, MicroRNAs, Natural Antisense
Transcripts, among others, all of which serve as powerful modulators of
gene expression.69 These molecules can exert tremendous control over gene
expression. A large number of diseases that are not amenable to treatment
with conventional pharmaceuticals or the canonical biotherapeutics can be
potentially attacked if the correct RNA therapeutic can be developed.70 Fur-
ther, since many of these RNAs are transcribed from the normal genome,
disease states that result from ncRNA-mediated misregulation of genes can
be detected through the use of ncRNA-targeted diagnostic tests.71
The potential clinical impact of these molecules should not be under-
stated. NcRNAs have been implicated in human diseases including various
cancers, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s, Huntington’s, Schizophrenia, and
Heart Disease, among others.72 Conventional drug discovery approaches
have shown significant success in treating most cancers, but the discovery of
a new class of potential treatments remains welcome news. What is most
enticing about the list of conditions implicating ncRNAs, however, is that
many of them represent conditions for which conventional approaches have
not been successful. In fact, for conditions such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s,
and Schizophrenia, conventional biotechnology has not even provided a
means of reliably diagnosing the condition prior to the onset of symptoms.
NcRNAs thus have significant potential as diagnostics and therapeutics for
some of our most intractable diseases.73
As noted above, in the early days of biotechnology, it was possible to
lay claim to a gene sequence, even where it was not perfectly clear what
form the final product would take. Thus, some measure of protection was
afforded to developers as they pursued their work and the investment needed
to pursue it. In the post-Myriad world, however, this protection is sharply
limited. The categorical subject matter exclusion created by the Myriad deci-
sion allows developers who have discovered novel intron-containing, pro-
tein-encoding genes to protect the sequences of cDNA versions of their
discoveries, but such protection is unavailable to developers working with
viral genes, bacterial genes, monocistronic mammalian genes, or genes (in a
68. See generally Encode Project, supra note 67; Derrien, supra note 67; see also Mar-
tin and Chang, supra note 59, at 1593; Ismael A. Vergara, et al., Genomic “Dark Matter” in
Prostate Cancer: Exploring the Clinical Utility of ncRNA as Biomarkers, 3 FRONTIERS IN
GENETICS 1 (2012).
69. Wahlestedt, supra note 13, at 438.
70. Id. at 433
71. Vergara, supra note 68, at 3.
72. Wahlestedt, supra note 13, at 436; see also Martin and Chang, supra note 59, at
1593.
73. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (filed Oct. 15, 2013).
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broader sense of the term than is recognized by Justice Thomas in his opin-
ion) that code for ncRNAs.
Nevertheless, the search for ways to exploit these discoveries in the
clinic has begun. In recent years, attempts have been made to develop diag-
nostic74 and therapeutic75 approaches based on non-coding RNA se-
quences.76 The combination of newly discovered disease targets with the
development of formulations that allow delivery of RNA therapeutics to dis-
ease sites77 has triggered a rush of new development. This rush to develop is
so enticing that industry players such as Sanofi SA and AstraZeneca are
partnering with smaller biotech companies for the development of ncRNA
drugs.78 A brief sample of biotech activity in the ncRNA space reveals R&D
stage companies developing these molecules as platform technologies for
drug development,79 diagnostics,80 and vaccine development.81 There is little,
if any, sign that this activity has abated since the June, 2013 announcement
of the Myriad decision. Importantly, this suggests that either companies have
found other ways of protecting their R&D investments, or the impacts of
Myriad simply have not yet caught up with them.
Patent activity in the area of ncRNA has also been robust: as of January
2014, the USPTO listed 737 issued patents and 1,982 published patent appli-
cations that were drawn in some fashion to ncRNA, for diagnostic, therapeu-
tic, or agricultural purposes.82 Tellingly, even in the wake of the Myriad
decision, some of these patents still claim genetic sequence information.83
While development of ncRNA technologies continues, the exclusion of
genomic sequences from the realm of patentable subject matter may ulti-
mately increase the uncertainty—and thus the perceived risk—surrounding
the development of these technologies to the point at which this promising
area of biotechnology no longer attracts the necessary investment. It seems
74. See Vergara, supra note 68.
75. See Dirk Haussecker, The Business of RNAi Therapeutics, 19 HUMAN GENE THER-
APY 451, 453–55 (May 2008).
76. See Martin and Chang, supra note 59; Wahlestedt, supra note 13.
77. See supra note 62.
78. See, e.g., Robert Weisman, Boston Area is Leading RNA Renaissance, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 5, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/02/05/companies-develop
ing-rna-therapeutics-are-suddenly-upswing-biomedical-world/CmN09T59A6qu7nteLhzIjP/sto
ry.html.
79. E.g., RaNA Therapeutics, RANA, http://ranarx.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
80. E.g., GenomeDx: Informing Decisions for Prostate Cancer Treatment, GENOMEDX
BIOSCIENCES, http://genomedx.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
81. See, e.g., Alphavax, Inc., http://www.alphavax.com/home.html (last visited 11/30/
2014); U.S. Patent No. 8,680,258 (Issued March 25, 2014).
82. The field of agricultural biotechnology is not a focus of this Note, but many of the
IP pressures and incentives affecting genetic discoveries in plants are common to biomedicine
as well.
83. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,623,836 col. 244 ll.15-30 (filed Nov. 23, 2010); U.S.
Patent No. 8,685,735 cols. 75–77 (filed Jun. 23, 2009).
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unlikely that such a wide area of clinical development will be allowed to fail
(in fact, it presently appears to be thriving).84 Nevertheless, the uncertainty
introduced into the law and the market by Myriad, Prometheus, and Bilski
remains, keeping with it the potential for significant disruption to emerging
sectors of the biotechnology enterprise. It is difficult to imagine that the
Supreme Court intended to introduce such a sharp asymmetry of incentives
into the biotechnology industry
In part III, this Note will address ways in which some of the most dele-
terious consequences of the Myriad decision can be defused before they
detonate.
III. WAYS TO FIX A BROKEN SYSTEM: POTENTIALLY VIABLE APPROACHES
TO PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER ANALYSIS
The fundamental flaws in the Myriad decision largely originate in the
failure of the Supreme Court to acknowledge that the difference between
genomic DNA and cDNA, at the sequence level, encompasses many more
distinctions than that between a man-made product and a natural product.
The Court did not address the reality that a “gene” may encompass any num-
ber of genetically heritable biological units other than protein coding re-
gions. Thus, it failed to accommodate the ramifications of declaring a small
subset of genes to be patentable while casting the rest of the DNA in the
biosphere into the public domain. Given the potentially disastrous conse-
quences of this decision for the future of biomedical research, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court intended this. Rather, this decision partially reflects
the fact that the Court was faced with a matter of greater technical complex-
ity than it could reasonably be expected to accommodate.85 However, even
with the Prometheus/Myriad/Bilski triad in place, reasonably stable intellec-
tual property estates are likely to continue to play a key role in technology
development. In assessing possible ways forward, there are three major ap-
proaches: ignoring the problem, avoiding the problem, and solving the prob-
lem. Below, I address each approach, pointing out the dangers of ignoring
the issues raised by Myriad and other recent patentable subject matter deci-
sions; assessing the likelihood that avoidance mechanisms might succeed;
and suggesting a plausible mechanism for solving these problems. In the
84. See, e.g., Weisman, supra note 78.
85. Justice Thomas obviously went to great lengths to describe the world of molecular
biology in the Myriad decision, but it evinced a grasp of the subject that would cause any
individuals “ordinarily skilled in the art” to wince—one commentator famously compared it to
“[A]n earnest seventh-grader’s book report.” The Supreme Court’s Sketchy Science: Their
BRCA Patent Ruling Reads Like an Earnest Seventh Grader’s Book Report, SLATE (June 14,
2014, 12:15 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/06/supreme
_court_patent_case_science_the_justices_misunderstand_molecular_biology.html; see also
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
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end, as is generally true, a simple, effective, and easily deployable solution
should prevail. I will argue that this solution has already been suggested by
the Court, and by a slight reordering of the present “Law of Nature” analy-
sis, order can be restored.
A. Ignoring the Problem by Embracing the Current Landscape
The fact that significant numbers of patents are still being issued claim-
ing genomic sequences suggests that the PTO is willing to construe Myriad
narrowly.86 It should, of course, never be assumed that PTO actions are pre-
dictive of what the courts downstream will do, and the instability that is
introduced by upheavals in a definition of patentable subject matter offers
numerous opportunities for mischief. At the level of the District Courts and
the Federal Circuit, however, the decision in Ariosa v. Sequenom, that circu-
lating fetal DNA is unpatentable as being identical to genomic DNA, sug-
gests that the courts are willing to apply Myriad in a more broad and
straightforward way.87 On the other hand, in one of the two other recent
decisions regarding molecular diagnostics, Smartgene v. A.B.L, the diagnos-
tic in question was found to be unpatentable on the basis that the algorithm
was drawn to a set of mental steps, rather a law of nature.88 This may sug-
gest that in the realm of genomic diagnostics, patentable subject matter de-
terminations can be made on the basis of the diagnostic algorithm, rather
than the sequence of the underlying gene. Determining the courts’ view of
Myriad with regard to genetic diagnostics is not helped by the fact that the
only post-CLS Bank decision relating to a genetic diagnostic involved facts
that were significantly similar to those in Prometheus (the claim was based
on a correlation between a single gene and a single phenotype).89
Overall, these decisions point to an incoherent view of patentable sub-
ject matter doctrines as applied to biotechnology. In dealing with gene-cen-
tric technologies, this uncertainty with regard to the “law of nature” or
“product of nature” determinations may continue to be problematic. Devel-
opment of drugs and next-generation diagnostics is extremely expensive,
and the patent monopoly is the primary mechanism we use to allow innova-
tors (and their investors) to recoup their substantial inputs. Endangering pat-
ent protection carries with it the risk of endangering the innovation it
incentivizes.
86. See supra note 83. However, it must be noted that formal examiner guidelines based
on Myriad have not been issued.
87. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., No. C 11-06391 SI 2013 WL 5863022,
at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013).
88. SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 955 (Fed.
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 13-1299, 2014 WL 1669340 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014).
89. Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings, No. 12-1736-LPS-
CJB, 2014 WL 4379587, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014).
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Though simple diagnostics relying on the correlation between a single
gene and a single phenotype may still lead to deployable diagnostic tests
with reduced patent incentives, as described above, the more complicated
case of diagnostic algorithms that require sequencing of more than one gene
has not yet been treated under the existing Supreme Court § 101 analysis.
Further, the case of therapeutic ncRNA molecules that do not deviate from
their genomic sequences (that is, their cDNA sequences are identical to their
genomic sequences) provides a conundrum: a drug that, though it may be a
distinct and useful composition of matter, may yet be unpatentable under
Myriad. A doctrinal solution is preferable to this confusion in order to as-
suage the fears of investors or at least to limit the number of spurious cease
and desist letters flying about
B. Avoiding the Problem
1. Widening the Experimental Use Exemption
In her concurring opinion in CLS Bank Inc., v. Alice Corp. (Fed. Cir.,
2013), Judge Newman suggested that a more robust experimental use excep-
tion would provide an escape hatch allowing courts to bypass the determina-
tion of the patentability of subject matter.90 Though this is not a new idea,91
Judge Newman offers a compelling new version. In this conception, the
courts would abandon determinations of statutory subject matter beyond
identifying whether the claim reads on a “process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter,”92 with the language of 35 U.S.C § 101 to be inter-
preted broadly, in keeping with the court’s previous practice.93 To address
problems of the potential preemption of entire fields of innovation, Judge
Newman would allow other inventors to carry out research on patented items
in order to determine their properties, understand their mechanisms, or to
develop improvements.94
The experimental use exception to patent infringement, as derived from
the case law, is currently limited in most cases to satisfying “idle curiosity”
or “philosophical inquiry” and nothing more.95 This is a narrow opening in
most cases. However, the fields of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals bene-
fit from a unique history of statutory experimental use exceptions. In Roche
v. Bolar, the Federal Circuit initially held pharmaceutical research to the
same standard as every other field, holding virtually all experimental uses of
90. CLS Bank, Inc. v. Alice Corp., 717 F. 3d 1269, 1321–27 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 134
S.Ct. 2347 (2014).
91. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989).
92. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
93. CLS Bank, Inc., 717 F. 3d at 1326–27.
94. Id. at 1324–35.
95. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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patented compounds to be infringing.96 In order to provide greater access to
generic drugs, Congress responded by enacting the Hatch-Waxman amend-
ments. In relevant part, these amendments provide that researchers pursuing
therapeutic biotechnology products regulated by the FDA are exempt from
infringement liability so long as the research activities are in preparation for
a required regulatory submission.97 The goal was to allow generics manufac-
turers to prepare their FDA submissions prior to the expiration of the patents
on the pioneer drug. This created a wider experimental use exception for
therapeutic development. In a later case, Merck v. Integra, the Supreme
Court held that the experimental use exemption was to be interpreted
broadly, and could encompass preclinical studies of a patented product, in-
cluding those geared toward the generation of improvements, so long as a
future regulatory filing could be reasonably anticipated.98
The existence of this relatively broad exception does not, however, miti-
gate the confusion that is generated by trying to parse the patentability of
information, which may or may not fall into one of the explicit § 101 catego-
ries.99 Put another way, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals already possess
a significant exemption to infringement liability for experimental uses. Nev-
ertheless, as demonstrated by the continuing waves of § 101 cases that have
come before the courts, there remains a need to occasionally litigate patent
validity on the basis of patentable subject matter.
The broader issue is that granting an exception for experimental uses
leaves the patents in place, and thus there is a continuing potential for dam-
aging assertions or litigation attempts. The probability that a legally unso-
phisticated scientist may respond to a cease-and-desist letter by abandoning
otherwise allowable research without complaint should not be discounted,
nor should the sort of risk-balancing required of small, tenuously funded
R&D-stage companies.100 Thus, a doctrine that has the potential to prevent
overbroad patents from issuing in the first place is preferable.101
96. Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical, 733 F.2d 858, 863–64 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
97. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
98. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
99. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317,
344–45 (2007).
100. See Maureen E. Boyle, Leaving Room for Research: The Historical Treatment of
the Common Law Research Exemption in Congress and the Courts, and Its Relationship to
Biotech Law and Policy, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH. 269, 302–3 (2010); see also Lori B. Andrews,
Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3 NATURE REVIEWS GENET-
ICS 803, 806 (2002).
101. Though the remainder of the Note will treat the ways in which judicial actors can
structure patentable subject matter analysis, these rules, insofar as they affect the section 101
criteria for patentability, will also be given effect in USPTO examination guidelines; thus it is
important to remember that changes in judicial treatment of patentable subject matter can also
prevent such problematic patents from issuing through their influence on the PTO.
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2. Avoiding Patentable Subject Matter Analysis
Patentable subject matter analysis under the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tions of 35 U.S.C. §101 is contentious and rife with unexpected effects. Cre-
ating an objective standard for the grant of a patent by abandoning §101
analysis as a test for patentability in favor of an amalgam of novelty, nonob-
viousness, and enablement thus becomes enticing. It seems on the surface
that objectively, either the prior art exists or it doesn’t; and if it does exist, it
either anticipates every element of a claim or it doesn’t.102 Likewise, the
patent as a whole enables one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the
invention, or it doesn’t; it evidences in its written description that the appli-
cant was in possession of the invention at the time of filing or it doesn’t.103
By comparison, the appeal to judicial fiat (see below) inherent in the present
patentable subject matter analysis barely makes sense.
It remains possible, however, that a discovery may be novel, nonobvi-
ous, and enabled, while there exist significant policy reasons to deny it a
patent. This seems to be the fundamental logic behind the “law of nature”
and “product of nature” exceptions from patentable subject matter. There is
a longstanding strain in patent law to bar patenting of inventions that would
remove too much of a natural law from the public domain, or lay a monop-
oly on all uses of a natural product, thus denying the use of the fundamental
raw materials of innovation to other inventors.104 As Katherine J. Strandburg
points out, patentable subject matter analysis provides a necessary safety
valve, allowing the courts to deny patent protection to those discoveries that,
even though they would meet the other criteria for patentability, would also
encroach unconscionably onto the public domain.105
If we must grant that patentable subject matter analysis is a necessary
evil, it should be carried out in a more coherent way. The present conception
of the patentable subject matter question formulates the judicially created
patentability requirements, at least rhetorically, as a threshold that must be
met before other requirements can be invoked.106 Given the tortured path of
any patent before it reaches the stage of judicial invalidity determination, it
is not clear that in practice subject matter considerations are truly a “thresh-
old.”107 However, the fact that cases continue to be decided on the basis of
patentable subject matter is concerning, especially when alternative grounds
102. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
103. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
104. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); see also Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diag-
nostic Methods After In Re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 61 (2012).
105. Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563, 616
(2012).
106. See, e.g., Application of Bergy (In re Bergy), 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979),
aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook. 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
107. See Strandburg, supra note 105; see, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601
(2010).
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for patent invalidity are readily apparent suggests that courts still view some
element of primacy in the patentable subject matter determination.108
Acknowledging this reality, Dennis Crouch and Robert Merges suggest
the approach of reviewing all of the elements of patentability simultane-
ously, taking patentability analysis as a cohesive whole rather than a set of
arbitrarily ordered steps.109 Viewing patentability doctrines all at once has
the advantage of allowing the reviewing court to select the point of greatest
weakness in invalidating a bad patent. This would allow courts to sidestep
patentable subject matter analysis in a majority of cases.110 This is not a
complete solution, as it does not account for the small percentage of patents
for which invalidity must be found in order to protect the public domain. For
these difficult cases, a coherent approach to patentable subject matter analy-
sis is required.
C. Solving the Problem by Revising the
Patentable Subject Matter Test
As noted above, a patent claim that recites a “law of nature,”111 “mental
process,”112 or “abstract idea”113 will be held to be invalid as being drawn to
unpatentable subject matter. While the Court has handed down these three
standards, there has been little real guidance in how to apply them.114 In its
present form, patentable subject matter analysis proceeds nominally in two
steps: first, courts determine whether the subject matter of an invention is
drawn to one of the excluded categories, and then the invention as a whole is
scrutinized to identify an “inventive concept.”115 As a subsidiary concern,
the scope of the claim is examined to determine whether it preempts a law of
nature or abstract idea, or whether it is otherwise overbroad.116 As a part of
this, courts can determine whether the claim is drawn to an unpatentable law
of nature, or whether it is drawn to a patentable application of a law of
nature.117 This shifts the focus of the inquiry to the degree of the human
contribution to the invention,118 rather than the express claim language. No-
108. See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Or-
dering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 (2010).
109. Id. at 1680–81
110. Id. at 1686–87
111. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
112. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 608–11 (2010).
113. See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 608–11 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981);
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)).
114. Crouch and Merges, supra note 108, at 1677–78; Eisenberg, supra note 104, at
66–65; Kane, supra note 4, at 5, 33.
115. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
116. Strandburg, supra note 107, at 588.
117. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71–72; CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
118. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013) (“The location and order of the nucleotides existed in nature before Myriad found them.
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tably, this analysis makes use of a two-step test in which neither step is
required to objectively address the invention as it is formally claimed.
In practice in the post-Myriad world, the analysis continues to be exer-
cised in exactly this way, with the preemption analysis explicitly relegated to
the status of a secondary consideration.119 Ariosa v. Sequenom is the first
biotechnology patentable subject matter case to reach the Federal Circuit
since Myriad. The case involves the patentability of diagnostic tests utilizing
circulating cell-free fetal DNA for prenatal genetic diagnosis. The Federal
Circuit did not rule on subject matter eligibility, and after carrying out
claims construction, remanded the case to the Northern District of Califor-
nia. In a fairly conventional move similar to the reasoning in Prometheus,
the district court held that Ariosa had not added enough to the “natural phe-
nomenon” to merit patentability.120 As a secondary consideration, the court
also held Ariosa’s patent would effectively preempt all uses of the phenome-
non; this was taken as an element supporting the policy underlying subject
matter exclusions rather than as a dispositive element of the inquiry.121 As in
Myriad, the court first determined that the underlying principle was either a
law or product of nature, before deciding the case based on the value added
by the inventors.
What constitutes a “law of nature” or a “product of nature” as opposed
to a patentable “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof,”122 is not always clear, even to the
inventors, practitioners, and PTO examiners who straddle these lines on a
daily basis.123 If laws and products of nature are per se unpatentable, it
makes no sense to require judges to make that determination when even
those ordinarily (or even extraordinarily) skilled in the art may not be able to
easily decide. On the other hand, the question of whether all uses of a law or
product of nature are preempted by a claim is one that is at least amenable to
analysis. Traditionally, even as acknowledged by the Myriad court, preemp-
tion has formed the basic rationale for the exclusion of laws and products of
nature from patentability.124 Though it may seem circular at first blush, one
Nor did Myriad create or alter the genetic structure of DNA. Instead, Myriad’s principal con-
tribution was uncovering the precise location and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes within chromosomes 17 and 13. The question is whether this renders the genes patenta-
ble.”); see also id. at 2114–15 (characterizing the underlying Federal Circuit decision as rely-
ing on competing formulations of the amount of human contribution to the invention); id. at
2119 (characterizing cDNA as patentable because it is made by human intervention).
119. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., No. C 11-06391 SI, 2013 WL 5863022
at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013).
120. Id. at *8–9.
121. Id. at *11.
122. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
123. See, e.g. Kelly Servick, Biotech Feels A Chill From Changing U.S. Patent Rules.
345 Science 14, 15 (July 4, 2014).
124. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013).
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of the elements that defines a fundamental law of nature is that a claim
drawn to it will preempt all other attempts to solve the problem by similar
means, by barring other innovators from using the same “basic tools of sci-
entific and technological work”125 to solve other problems unforeseen by the
first inventor. Thus, operationalizing the preemption analysis offers an ap-
proach to determining subject matter eligibility that, though it necessarily
leaves significant room for judicial discretion, is at least bounded by an ob-
jective standard, and more importantly, can be executed by non-experts.
Achieving this may be as simple as reversing the order of the current patent-
able subject matter analysis: instead of asking whether the claim is drawn to
a law or product of nature, and only then asking whether it would preempt
entire areas of innovation, judges could instead simply ask about the extent
of the preemption. If the claim would preempt all inquiries into a field of
study or all other uses of a material that was not a product of human ingenu-
ity, then it can be said to read on an unpatentable law or product of nature
and should not be allowed to stand.
The following provides an example of how this type of analysis may be
carried out. First, the court should construe the claim carefully, and in doing
so, identify the underlying physical premise of each element of the claim.
Next, the court should identify how much of each underlying premise is
foreclosed by the claim as construed. Finally, the operative questions can be
asked: does this foreclosure eliminate either, 1) all uses of one or more of the
underlying premises, or 2) all possible solutions to the problem addressed by
the claim? Fundamentally this inquiry addresses whether there is any fore-
seeable space left for further innovation in a field—space for competition
being a key element of using the patent system to advance progress in the
useful arts.126 This inquiry addresses the claim as it stands, rather than trying
to parse out the importance of the inventor’s contribution. Ultimately it is the
claim that defines the invention, not the process by which the invention was
arrived at.127
There are relatively few cases one can imagine in which a claim would
be novel, nonobvious, meet the §112 requirements for written description
and enablement, and yet still preempt unanticipated or unforeseeable areas
of innovation or discovery. Unfortunately, the patenting of genetic sequence
information is one of those rare examples, making it important to finally
develop a patentable subject matter analysis that works. Utilizing the test
proposed above, the specific claims at issue in Myriad would still have been
held to be unpatentable, as would genetic information generally. However,
the categorical protection for cDNA sequences likely would not be upheld
125. Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289
(2012)).
126. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
127. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S 568 (1876)
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either. What the field would gain from an operationalized preemption test is
the certainty that comes from a uniform predictable standard across all areas
of biotechnology and pharmaceutical development. Eliminating the distor-
tions in incentives that come from holding that some areas of drug and diag-
nostic development are eligible for patent protection and others are not, may
well be worth the trouble of having to rearrange our thinking on patentable
subject matter.
Applying the test above to “abstract ideas” would have a more immedi-
ate side benefit in biotechnology as well: it would hold open the possibility
that genetic diagnostics are not per se unpatentable. Though the tests at issue
in Prometheus may not have survived this analysis, it is likely that other,
more complex diagnostic methods would. A more complex algorithmic
comparison is unlikely to monopolize the phenomenon underlying the test,
or to claim all solutions to a problem.128 Providing an opening within which
diagnostic product developers can maintain strong protection for the key ele-
ments of their technology (their correlations and algorithms, if not the under-
lying genes) keeps the patent system in a position of support for a key
element of the future of medicine.
CONCLUSION
In the more mature areas of biotechnology, the development of biother-
apeutics will continue apace, and the alignment of incentives is still such that
diagnostic development will proceed. As for the younger fields, it is not yet
known what will emerge from the world of ncRNA, but it is inconceivable
that the Supreme Court meant to limit such a promising sector of health
innovation. Myriad makes it much more difficult to obtain protection for
early stage development in this area, while Prometheus makes life difficult
for those that would develop genomic diagnostics. At present, as in the past,
patent protection for biotechnology innovation relies on the creativity of pat-
ent practitioners and inventors to work around the amorphous restrictions on
subject matter eligibility. Myriad and Prometheus provide another chance
for patent practitioners to figure out what aspects of the biotechnology in-
dustry are eligible for patent protection. Barring a more objective approach
to patentable subject matter, such as the one suggested here, it is inevitable
128. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,700,286 (filed Apr. 13, 2012) (describing a complex,
multigenic sequencing-based method of cancer diagnosis). Under Mayo Protective Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2013), this method could reasonably be seen as having
been drawn to a “law of nature”—the preexisting relationship between genetic mutations and
cancer progression (though the fact that the patent issued suggests that the PTO does not share
this view—but the worry is in what the courts would do). The claims given clearly do not
foreclose all possible uses of the cited genes or all possible means of detecting cancer. Thus,
reliance on preemption analysis provides diagnostic methods cover that a strict reading of
Prometheus does not.
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that another change of course will arise in the near future. Innovation will
continue, however, and innovators will be watching how patent law tries to
keep pace with the work in the lab.
